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1 Introduction
Economic theory tells that with uncertainty and under complete markets, Pareto efficiency requires that
agents’ consumption should be fully insured against idiosyncratic income shocks. Wilson (1968) shows
that individual consumption commoves positively with aggregate consumption according to the ratio of
absolute risk tolerance of an agent over the sum of absolute risk tolerance of all agents. When agents
have homogeneous preferences, the symmetric Pareto efficient allocation giving the same weight to each
agent requires that aggregate endowment be shared equally between agents. However, empirical tests
of consumption insurance seem to reject full risk sharing (Mace 1991, Cochrane 1991, Townsend 1994,
Grimard, 1995, Jalan and Ravallion, 1999, Dubois, 2000). In less developed economies where income risk
and random shocks are clearly very important for individuals, the problem of risk sharing is a main issue.
The problem of commitment is actually stringent for the implementation of the full risk sharing allocations
since the sharing of aggregate resources requires the best endowed agents to divide their revenue with less
endowed agents. Ex ante, with not perfectly correlated incomes, everyone ought to commit to implement
full risk sharing after realization of idiosyncratic shocks. However, ex post, lucky agents have high incentives
to deviate from these promised transfers. Therefore, the enforcement of committed arrangements is crucial
for ex post efficiency. If formal commitment is not possible, the repetition of these relationships between
agents may make risk sharing possible (Coate and Ravallion, 1993, Kimball 1988). Actually, the subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the infinitely repeated game with threats of reversion to autarchy
(which constitutes the minmax value of the game) enables to enforce some risk sharing. The set and
performance of sustainable equilibria depends crucially on agents’ patience (Coate and Ravallion, 1993,
Fafchamps, 1998). Fafchamps (1998) generalizes the two person model of Coate and Ravallion (1993)
and shows that social or moral sanctions and community pressure against deviators can enlarge the set
of sustainable equilibria. Fafchamps (1998) shows that when wealth heterogeneity is present, some quasi
credit arrangement where loans and repayments are contingent to income shocks may be a mechanism
able to implement informal insurance. Murgai, Winters, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2002) point out that
limits to informal insurance may come from an “association cost” and an “extraction cost”. However,
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these exogenously given costs do not allow to understand the structural relationship between risk aversion,
group size, heterogeneity of preferences, individual strategies and the degree of risk sharing achieved. As
demonstrated also by Genicot and Ray (2002), the formation of coalitions within an informal risk sharing
group may threaten the stability of such risk sharing groups, leading to a limited size of informal insurance
groups.
Starting with the idea that the limits to the extent of informal risk sharing may be due to limited
commitment problems, we want to explain the determinants of full risk sharing and test some theoretical
predictions. As the value of perfect risk sharing determines the likelihood that commitment problems may
alter risk sharing within a community, we study the theoretical effects of preferences heterogeneity on the
value of perfect risk sharing within a community. We also look at the effect of the size of the risk sharing
group and the degree of cross-sectional correlation of income shocks. Then, we show why in a limited
commitment environment, the effect of the size of the risk sharing group may not be the same according
to the possibility of households to commit to some risk sharing mechanisms and deviate individually or
collectively. We derive several theoretical relationships that are supposed to affect the benefits of full risk
sharing and thus the likelihood to deviate from such a risk sharing arrangement within a community.
Then, using some panel data form rural Pakistan, we try to test some testable implications on the
consumption smoothing by households. We first present how one can allow heterogeneity of preferences
in particular in risk aversion when testing full insurance on consumption data. Our empirical tests show
that full insurance is rejected but we are then able to delimit some sets of villages where full insurance
is rejected and other where it is not. Assuming that different degrees of risk sharing are reached by these
heterogeneous communities, we study some characteristics of these villages and show some interesting
correlations between them and the rejection of full insurance. Moreover, as our method allows to identify
some heterogeneity in risk preferences, we study in particular the correlation between the village level of
risk aversion and risk sharing. Our empirical results show that the more incomes are correlated across
households within the village the more likely risk sharing is rejected and the higher the risk aversion level
of the village the less consumption is insured against idiosyncratic shocks.
Section 2 presents some theoretical model that allows to derive some testable predictions on risk sharing.
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Section 3 presents the econometric method, estimation and results.
2 Heterogeneity of Preferences, Limited Commitment and Coalitions
in Informal Insurance
Intuitively, mutual insurance is better as the size of the risk pooling group increases because aggregate
income becomes less and less risky. Then, why risk sharing groups would not become larger and tend
to pool risk of all agents in the economy? Several reasons have been advanced. Fafchamps (1998) tells
that information acquisition in larger and larger groups becomes costly and that this “transaction cost”
could limit the group size. Fafchamps (1992) also says that the formation of a subcoalition can threaten
the implementability of the allocation. Genicot and Ray (2002) show this phenomenon in a model with
endogenous risk sharing groups. Coate and Ravallion (1993) limit their analysis to two agents and do
not meet this problem of sub-coalition formation since the only feasible sub-coalition is then autarchy.
Fafchamps (1998) and most other papers on informal risk sharing adopting the same kind of model with
limited commitment use limited threatening strategies and avoid the problem of the size of the risk sharing
group by considering that each agent’s strategy is to cooperate unless one deviates in which case all agents
of the insurance group revert to autarchy. Murgai, Winters, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2002) analyze the
optimal size of the informal risk sharing group as well as the optimal extent of risk sharing by modelling
an exogenous cost function (increasing in the share of exogenous income that must be shared and the
size of the group) able to embody what they name as the association and extraction costs of informal
insurance. The idea being that the association cost is due to the cost of sharing information on incomes
of each member of the group which is assumed increasing with the size of the group. The extraction
cost corresponding to the cost of enforcing a given extent of risk sharing measured by the parameter α
determining the part of the "excess" income which must be shared with other members. These two ideas
seem relevant but one would like to be able to explain them endogenously. In this paper, we show why
informal risk sharing groups cannot be infinitely large. Genicot and Ray (2002) model a similar problem
and show why coalitions limit the size of the informal risk sharing groups.
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2.1 Complete Markets Hypothesis
We first look at the case where markets are complete and full insurance is obtained. In this case, denoting
ui0t the marginal utility of consumption for i at time t, µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the
aggregate resource constraint, these first order conditions imply that for any agent i :
∀i, ∀t,
ui0t
¡
cit+1
¢
ui0t
¡
cit
¢ = µt+1
µt
(1)
Thus, only aggregate risk should matter and consumption is insured against idiosyncratic risk. Then the
Borch rule of risk sharing implies that in the particular case of utility functions with Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (ui
¡
cit
¢
= −(1/σi) exp
¡
−σicit
¢
, where σi is the absolute risk aversion parameter), and with
λi the Pareto weight of agent i in the social planner’s objective, we have
ckt = ϕk +
1/σkPN
i=1 1/σi
µXN
i=1
cit
¶
(2)
where ϕk =
lnλk
σk −
PN
i=1
1
σi
lnλi
σk
PN
i=1
1
σi
.
This sharing rule shows that agents having the same preferences and the same weight in the planner’s
objective will obtain an equal share of aggregate resources. With heterogenous preferences, individual
consumption variability is inversely proportional to its absolute risk aversion. Remark that if all the λ0s
are equal then ϕk = 0 and consumption is simply a share of aggregate consumption.
This implies that, if aggregate resources are distributed normally, defining the average absolute risk
tolerance 1σ =
1
N
PN
i=1 1/σi, the value of perfect risk sharing within a group of sizeN denoted v
c
N
³
N, 1σ ,
1
σk
´
for agent k of absolute risk tolerance 1σk is
vcN
µ
N,
1
σ
,
1
σk
¶
=
1
1− βEu
k
³
ckt
´
=
1
1− βu
k
µ
ϕk +
σ
σk
E
µ
1
N
XN
i=1
cit
¶
− σ
2
V
µ
1
N
XN
i=1
cit
¶¶
= − 1
1− β
1
σk
exp−σk
µ
ϕk +
σ
σk
h
y − σk
2
V y
i¶
where y denotes expected aggregate consumption per household (y = E 1N
PN
i=1 c
i
t) and V y denotes the
variance of 1N
PN
i=1 c
i
t.
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Now, for simplicity, let’s assume that the Pareto weights are equal. Then, the value of perfect risk
sharing among a group of size N for an agent of risk aversion σk is
vcN
µ
N,
1
σ
,
1
σk
¶
= − 1
1− β
1
σk
exp−σ
h
y − σk
2
V y
i
and implies that:
Proposition 1 vcN
³
N, 1σ ,
1
σk
´
is increasing concave in N , decreasing in 1σk . It is decreasing in
1
σ if y −
σk
2 V y > 0.
Proof. As V y is decreases and is convex in N , it is easy to show that vcN
³
N, 1σ ,
1
σk
´
is increasing
concave in N . Moreover, it is increasing in σ if y − σk V y2 and decreasing in
1
σk because
∂
∂
³
1
σk
´ (1− β) vcN = − exp−µ 1σ hy − σk2 V yi
¶∙
1 + σσk
V y
2
¸
< 0
This proposition shows that the gains from perfect risk sharing increase with the size of the group but
at a decreasing rate. Also, it shows that the value of perfect risk sharing for agent k decreases with risk
aversion of the agent k (keeping the average risk tolerance 1σ constant) and increases in the average risk
tolerance of the risk sharing group 1σ .
Heterogeneity of Preferences and Endogenous Size of Risk Sharing Group
We now consider the possibility that insurance groups form endogenously based on preferences. Let’s
consider that given, a distribution of preferences in the economy, risk sharing groups can then be constituted
of different sizes and with different levels of risk aversion parameters.
Then, a condition for this endogenous formation of risk sharing groups to be in equilibrium is that any
two risk sharing groups characterized by the size of the group (N) and the level of risk tolerance 1σ should
provide the same expected utility. Thus, agent k gets the same expected utility in groups i and j, if
vcN
µ
Ni,
1
σi
,
1
σk
¶
= vcN
µ
Nj,
1
σj
,
1
σk
¶
(3)
According to proposition 1, vcN
³
Ni,
1
σi ,
1
σk
´
is increasing in 1σi and Ni. Thus (3) implies that given
1
σk ,
the size of the risk sharing group Ni will be decreasing with the risk tolerance level 1σi . Therefore, if
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informal risk sharing groups actually form upon risk aversion, the value of perfect risk sharing for σk will
be vcN
³
N
³
1
σi(k)
´
, 1σi(k) ,
1
σk
´
if the average risk tolerance of the risk sharing group of k is σi(k).
2.2 Limited Commitment
Now, let’s consider an environment with limited commitment implying that any risk sharing agreement
must be self enforcing within a set of players. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) estimate the benchmark
structural model where individual deviations may limit risk sharing. Theoretically, Fafchamps (1998)
or Coate and Ravallion (1993) use the result of Abreu (1988) that any sub-game perfect equilibrium for
infinitely repeated game with discounting is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the strategy giving the worst
utility to agents who deviate. However, this threat may not be credible because several agents deviating
simultaneously can form another group providing them a better utility than that of autarchy. Assume that
we have N agents in a simple closed exchange economy. Individual income are random and present some
idiosyncratic risk. Assume that they are independent and identically distributed across periods, identically
distributed across agents either independently or with some degree of correlation ρ < 1. In this simple
framework, even without commitment of agents not to renege ex post (after the realization of shocks), the
cooperative solution can be a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game provided that
some self sustainability constraints be satisfied. This sustainability constraint tells that the short run gain
of any deviation must not exceed the long term gain from cooperation. For this, we use Abreu’s result
(Abreu, 1988) to construct agents’ strategies. The strategy of an agent belonging to the informal insurance
group, is such that he cooperates until someone deviates in which case he also deviates to autarchy where
he gets his short term deviation pay-off plus the discounted utility of autarchy. Let’s assume that we want
to implement the full risk sharing allocation corresponding to the case where agents enjoy the same Pareto
weights. In this case, they should divide equally the aggregate endowment among them. Let yi be the
realization at time t of the income stream of agent i. Therefore, the self sustainability constraint for each
agent i = 1, ..,N is
u (yi) + βva < u (yN ) + βv
c
N (4)
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where yN = 1N
PN
i=1 yi, va = E [
P∞
τ=0 β
τu (yiτ )] is the expected discounted payoff of autarchy and vcN =
E [
P∞
τ=0 β
τu (yNτ )] is the expected discounted payoff of cooperation in an informal insurance group of
size N . The results of Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993) follow. The feasibility of the informal
insurance arrangement depends on agents patience (β), on their preference with respect to risk and on
income distributions that all determine va and vcN .
For agents who have to transfer some part of their wealth to less endowed agents, (4) shows that the gain
from deviation to autarchy never exceeds the benefit from cooperation if the utility difference between
cooperation and autarchy is sufficiently large. Then, the cooperative equilibrium is implementable (Coate
and Ravallion, 1993).
Intuitively, the informal insurance group should be as large as possible since a larger group allowing to
mutually insure better against idiosyncratic risk of individual income. Actually, with an increasing concave
utility function u (.), vcN = E [
P∞
τ=0 β
τu (yNτ )] is an increasing function of the size of the group N thanks
to risk pooling. Then, we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The welfare gain form perfect risk sharing vcN − va increases with the size of the group N .
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Thus, if the informal insurance group is sufficiently large so that risk pooling provides a sufficiently
large utility gain from cooperation over autarchy, then the informal insurance is self enforceable. However,
though the Pareto optimal full risk sharing allocation may be implementable, it has not necessarily the
“core property”. Actually, it may occur that a coalition of k agents (1 < k < N) may improve their
utility by leaving the group and forming another smaller coalition. In a different model, Genicot and Ray
(2003) introduce a concept of stability of groups and show then that the size of stable informal risk sharing
groups is bounded. The difficulty is to define the structure of the game that would represent the intuition
that threats of coalition formation should be taken into account. However, one can simply define some
coalition-proofness conditions that would be required for any informal risk sharing group to be sustainable
against deviations of coalitions.
8
Actually, risk sharing among N agents provides an instantaneous expected utility of Eu (yN). The
expected discounted pay-off of cooperation among k agents is vck = E [
P∞
τ=0 β
τu (yk)] (by convention
vc1 = va which is the expected discounted utility of autarchy). Thus, one can say that an informal risk
sharing group of size N will be sustainable if all deviations of coalitions of subsets of these N agents
cannot obtain a better utility by deviating jointly where in case of deviations they share income among the
members of the coalitions and obtain an expected utility in future periods equal to the value of cooperating
among them. This means that the following conditions must be satisfied: ∀k < N , ∀ {yi}i=1,.,N :
u (yk) + βv
c
k ≤ u (yN ) + βvcN
It implies that we need that ∀k < N ,
max
∀{yi}i=1,.,N
{u (yk)− u (yN )} ≤ β (vcN − vck)
If income has a bounded support [y, y] then1 the required condition is that ∀k < N
u (y)− u
µ
k
N
y +
N − k
N
y
¶
≤ β (vcN − vck) (5)
For comparison purpose, let’s consider the case where only deviations to autarchy are feasible. Then the
condition is that
u (y)− u
µ
y +
y − y
N
¶
≤ β (vcN − vc1)
Thus, it is always satisfied for N large enough since u (y) − u
³
y +
y−y
N
´
≤ u (y) − u
¡
y
¢
and vcN − vc1 is
increasing in N (as soon limN→∞ β (vcN − vc1) > u (y)− u(y)).
However, the conditions (5) are not always satisfied for N large enough. Actually, this would imply that
u (y)− u
µ
y + y
2
¶
≤ β
³
vcN − vcN/2
´
1Actually
max
yk,yN
(u (yk)− u (yN )) = maxyk,yN−k
µ
u (yk)− u
µ
k
N yk +
N − k
N yN−k
¶¶
= max
yk
µ
u (yk)− u
µ
k
N yk +
N − k
N y
¶¶
= u (y)− u
µ
k
N y +
N − k
N y
¶
because
∂
∂y
∙
u (y)− u
µ
k
N y +
N − k
N y
¶¸
=
∙
u0 (y)− kN u
0
µ
k
N y +
N − k
N y
¶¸
> 0
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which is not always true for N large enough since vcN−vcN/2 decreases and goes to zero with N (for example
if utility is quadratic, u(x) = x− σ2x2, in which case vcN − vcN/2 =
1
1−β
1
N
σ
2 (1− ρ)ω2).
We thus obtain the following general result similar to that of Genicot and Ray (2003):
Proposition 3 Large enough informal risk sharing groups are always sustainable against individual devi-
ations to autarchy but not to deviations by coalitions.
However, one could also define a stronger concept and require also that deviations to form a subcoalition
of size k must not be dominated by any sub-coalition, that is ∀ k < k0 ≤ N , ∀ {yi}i=1,.,N :
u (yk) + βv
c
k ≤ u (yk0) + βvck0 (6)
With lemma 7 in appendix A.1, we know that vck is increasing in k, so v
c
k < v
c
k0 if k < k
0. However, it may
be possible that yk > yk0 implying that the coalition proofness constraints may not always be respected. It
will depend on the income distributions determining vck0 − vck, and on the support of incomes determining
the maximal feasible difference u (yk) − u (yk0) between the average income of a group of size k and the
average income of a larger group.
The usual condition (Fafchamps, 1998, Coate and Ravallion, 1993) for cooperation to be a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game allowing only individual deviations is that ∀ {yi}i=1,.,N :
u (yi) + βv
c
1 ≤ u (yN) + βvcN (7)
Coalition proofness changes the set of risk sharing equilibria sustainable to deviations to autarchy (Fafchamps
1998, Coate and Ravallion, 1993) since it may happen that individual reversion to autarchy is not worth
compared to full risk sharing among the N agents while the joint deviation of a coalition is. This hap-
pens when yk > u
−1 [u (yN ) + β (v
c
N − vck)] while yi ≤ u−1 [u (yN ) + β (vcN − va)] (which is possible since
vck ≥ va = vc1).
We now consider a particular case of this model by specifying utility functions in order to derive some
testable predictions on informal insurance.
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2.3 Coalitions versus Individual Deviations in a Simplified Model of Informal Risk
Sharing
We now make some assumptions that simplify analytically the problem in order to derive some testable
predictions on a stylized model. Assume that we can write the expected utility of consumption as a
function of its mean and variance. This means that we neglect higher order moments of the consumption
distribution. However, if we assume that incomes are normally distributed and utility has a constant
absolute risk aversion or if utility is quadratic, then expected utility depends only on the mean and
variance of consumption.
For simplicity, let’s assume the following:
Assumption 1 The utility function is quadratic: u (z) = z − σ2 z2 (σ > 0).
Assumption 2 Incomes have mean y and support2 equal to [y, y] and variance-covariance matrix3 Ω =
(1− ρ)ω2I + ρω2J (in the special case of independence, ρ = 0 and Ω = ω2IN).
Assumption 1 implies that the expected utility is a mean variance criterion of the random consumption
level. ρ is the correlation between income of any two persons and ω2 their variance. For notational ease,
we note by σ (z) = −u
00(z)
u0(z) .
Lemma 4 With assumptions 1 and 2, the difference in the intertemporal utilities of cooperation between
N and k participants is
vcN − vck =
1
1− β
N − k
Nk
σ
2
(1− ρ)ω2 (8)
It is positive, increasing and concave in N, decreasing and convex in k, increasing in β, σ and ω2, and
decreasing in ρ.
Proof. For k = 1, .,N : vck = E
P∞
t=0 β
tu (ykt) =
1
1−βEu (yk)=
1
1−β
£
Eyk − σ2E(yk
2)
¤
. So vck =
1
1−β
h
Eyk − σ2 (V (yk) + (Eyk)
2)
i
. With Eyi = y and V (yi) = ω2, V (yk) = ω2
h
1−ρ
k + ρ
i
and Eyk = y, so
vcN − vck = 11−β
N−k
Nk
σ
2ω
2 (1− ρ).
2We assume that γ or y are small enough such that y < 1/γ.
3I is the identity matrix of size N and J is a square matrix of size N with all elements equal to one.
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The preceding lemma shows again that the value of cooperation within a larger group provides a higher
expected utility. It also shows that this difference is increasing with the degree of patience of agents. The
difference in the expected value of cooperation in a larger group is increasing but the marginal gain from
adding one more agent in the group is decreasing. Of course, this difference is increasing with risk aversion
(σ) and with the variability of income (ω2) but decreasing with the degree of correlation ρ between incomes
which is intuitive since the expected gain from pooling resources is smaller when income shocks are more
correlated.
For notational convenience, we define δ (k,N) the ratio of the maximal possible k-deviation gain over the
discounted expected gain of future risk sharing among N persons rather than k (omitting other parameters
in the arguments):
δ (k,N) =
maxyk,yN (u (yk)− u (yN))
β
¡
vcN − vck
¢
Of course, the informal insurance group is weakly coalition proof if and only if ∀k < N : δ (k,N) ≤ 1.
Within the same framework, the corresponding condition for sustainability of informal insurance with
respect to deviations to autarchy is δ (1, N) ≤ 1. Then, denoting N∗a the maximum size of the informal
insurance group sustainable against individual deviations and N∗ the maximum size of the coalition-proof
informal insurance group, we can prove that:
Proposition 5 With assumptions 1 and 2, N∗a and N∗are increasing in β, ω2, σ, and decreasing in ρ.
N∗ is smaller than N∗a and is finite (N
∗ < +∞). Moreover there exists β∗ < 1 such that for β > β∗,
N∗a = +∞.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
The fact that for β > β∗, N∗a = +∞ means that for sufficiently patient agents, the informal insurance
group is always sustainable against deviations to autarchy whatever the size of the group. Finally, one can
look at the welfare gains over autarchy or over coalitions of risk sharing among N agents. Using (8), we
can contrast the differences between the value of sharing risk among N agents and the value of autarchy
vcN − vc1 and the difference between the value of sharing risk among N agents and the value of sharing risk
within the coalition providing the highest welfare min
k∈{1,..,N−1}
(vcN − vck).
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Proposition 6 The differences between risk sharing in a group of size N and autarchy or risk sharing in
the best coalition of size k ∈ {1, ..,N − 1} satisfy the following inequalities
∂
∂N
µ
min
k∈{1,..,N−1}
(vcN − vck)
¶
< 0 <
∂
∂N
(vcN − vc1) (9)
and
∂
∂N∂ρ
(vcN − vc1) < 0 <
∂
∂N∂ρ
µ
min
k∈{1,..,N−1}
(vcN − vck)
¶
(10)
and
∂
∂N∂σ
(vcN − vc1) > 0 >
∂
∂N∂σ
µ
min
k∈{1,..,N−1}
(vcN − vck)
¶
(11)
Proof. Straightforward derivation using (8) and
min
k∈{1,..,N−1}
(vcN − vck) = vcN − vcN−1 =
1
1− β
1
N (N − 1)
σ
2
(1− ρ)ω2
Proposition 6 thus shows that the larger the size of the risk sharing group, the larger the welfare gains
of perfect risk sharing against autarchy but the smaller against coalitions. Also, the welfare gains over
autarchy of increasing the size of the group are lower with more correlated incomes (higher ρ) but the gains
over coalitions decrease at a lower rate with the size of the group for more correlated incomes. Finally,
with higher risk aversion (σ) the gains over autarchy increase more with the size of the group and the gains
over coalitions decrease more. These results imply some testable implications. Actually, if only individual
deviations threaten the sustainability of informal insurance groups but not coalitions, then the larger the
group size the larger the gains from cooperation. Moreover, testing whether coalition or only individual
deviations restrict risk sharing in a limited commitment environment will be provided by evidence on
whether the likelihood to accept perfect risk sharing increases or decreases with N for more risk averse
and less correlated incomes.
3 Econometric Estimation and Tests
In order to test the predictions about the sources of the limits to perfect risk sharing in a limited com-
mitment environment, we first present how one can account for heterogeneity in risk aversion in the tests
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of full insurance within each village. Then we present some stylized facts and the empirical tests on data
from rural Pakistan.
3.1 Testing Full Insurance with Heterogeneous Preferences
Most of the tests of the complete markets hypothesis assume homogeneity of preferences with respect to
risk. Some kind of heterogeneity is sometimes taken into account by parameterizing the marginal utility
of consumption (Mace, 1991, Cochrane, 1991) but never in the degree of risk aversion. Only Townsend
(1994) provides a test of full insurance with heterogeneity of risk aversion using household level time
series, but the power of the test is then very weak. With CARA preferences, full insurance predicts that
household consumption must be a linear function of aggregate consumption (Wilson, 1968) with a slope
equal to the ratio of household to community average absolute risk tolerance (the inverse of absolute risk
aversion). Townsend (1994) regresses household by household consumption on aggregate consumption at
the village level including successively proxy variables for household idiosyncratic shocks testing if the
coefficient of the idiosyncratic variable is equal to zero and if that of the aggregate consumption coefficient
is equal to one. But the power of these tests is very weak given the short time dimension of panel data
on consumption (10 periods in Townsend, 1994). Moreover, in the case where households would have a
constant absolute risk aversion equal to σi for household i, full risk sharing (complete markets) predicts
that the coefficient of aggregate consumption βi must be equal to the ratio of household to average absolute
risk tolerance i.e. βi =
1/σi
1
N
PN
j=1
1
σj
where N is the size of the risk sharing group (for example the village).
Consequently, the correct way to test the complete markets hypothesis with these time series estimates is
not to test βi = 1 (which amounts to assume homogeneity) but rather
1
N
PN
i=1 βi = 1 i.e. that the average
of estimated coefficients should be equal to one. However, this test remains weak and measurement errors
on consumption will turn it even more unreliable (Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997).
Another method of testing the full insurance property used by Townsend (1994) or Mace (1991) consists
in imposing homogeneity of risk aversion among agents. Then, thanks to panel data, the test consists in
regressing the first difference of household consumption (or its logarithm) on the income change and to test
that the income shock does not affect consumption change. This method is valid under the assumption that
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all agents have homogeneous risk aversion. However, the method consisting in using dummy variables to
purge the aggregate shock effect on consumption change (Deaton, 1997) instead of subtracting the average
consumption change to the individual consumption change (Grimard, 1997, Jalan and Ravallion, 1999)
allows to avoid the attenuation bias of the income coefficient under the alternative hypothesis where this
coefficient would be strictly positive (Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997). Actually, under the null hypothesis,
both methods lead to consistent estimators but under the alternative the method using differences to
aggregate consumption is biased. The complete markets hypothesis predicts that the marginal utility of
consumption increases at the same rate for each agent (Altug and Miller, 1990). With isoelastic utility
functions, even if preferences are heterogeneous and unobserved, it remains that an increasing function of
the growth rate of marginal utility depends only on aggregate resources and not on idiosyncratic shocks. If
idiosyncratic shocks are assumed independent of household preferences, then they must be cross sectionally
independent of the growth rate of consumption (Cochrane, 1991). Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) use this
method which depends crucially on the assumption of independence of preferences and idiosyncratic shocks
(which can be correlated if both are correlated to demographic characteristics for example).
Assume that the instantaneous utility of consumption c for household i at time t is of the isoelastic
following form4
βtuit (c) = exp (α (ezit)) c1−σ(zit)
1− σ (zit)
(12)
where vectors zit, ezit are characteristics of household i at time t and β the discount factor (vectors zit, ezit
can consist in the same or in different variables, their notations are distinguished in the econometric model
because they will not be treated in the same manner by the instrumentation method even if they can
finally be the same set of variables in the empirical application). We thus assume that households have a
constant relative risk aversion (in consumption level for a given household) equal to σ (zit) which depends
on some characteristics zit. Similarly, Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) and Hayashi, Altonji and
Kotlikoff (1996) parameterized multiplicative factors of marginal utility of consumption with observable
4The most prevalent parametric forms used are the exponential (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) and isoelastic (Constant
Relative Risk Aversion) forms. In the case of Mace (1991), it seems that the opposite conclusions given by CRRA or CARA
functions came from measurement error problems (Nelson, 1994). Ogaki and Zhang, 2001, use utility functions in the class of
HARA (Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion). However, our strategy is rather to allow for heterogeneity of risk aversion in the
class of CRRA functions than specifying a unique homogeneous HARA function for each household.
15
characteristics (α (ezit)) but were assuming that risk aversion was homogeneous across households or indi-
viduals. Hence, we have parameterized the marginal utility of consumption with α (ezit) and the relative
risk aversion by σ (zit).
The first order condition verified by the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between periods t
and t+ 1 is then:
u0it+1 (cit+1)
u0it (cit)
= εit+1 (13)
where εit+1 is a random variable whose distribution depends on the hypothesis on markets completeness.
Using (12), this first order condition can be written
α (ezit+1)− α (ezit)− σ (zit+1) ln cit+1 + σ (zit) ln cit = ln εit+1 (14)
The function σ (.) can be identified only up to a multiplicative constant. Assuming that the functions α (.)
and σ (.) are linear, we normalize σ (.) by writing
σ (zit) = 1 + zitσ (15)
The relative risk aversion of household i at t is assumed to be a function of observable characteristics zit.
Homogeneity of relative risk aversion among agents is obtained when σ = 0. The function α (.) allows
to introduce multiplicative shocks to marginal utility of consumption eventually depending on observable
characteristics ezit. Taking a linear additive form between an unobservable shock ηit and the factor ezitα
function of observable variables , we write
α (ezit) = ezitα+ ηit (16)
The term ηit captures unobserved specific effect multiplicative to marginal utility of consumption (for
example like individual variations in the discount factor).
Then the first order condition becomes
∆ ln cit+1 = [−zit+1 ln cit+1 + zit ln cit]σ +∆ezit+1α+∆ηit+1 − ln εit+1 (17)
or equivalently
∆ ln cit+1 = [−zit+1∆ ln cit+1 − ln cit∆zit+1]σ +∆ezit+1α+∆ηit+1 − ln εit+1 (18)
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where ∆ is the first difference operator defined by ∆Xt+1 = Xt+1 −Xt.
Assume now that consumption is measured with error independently distributed across households and
periods. We observe ecit instead of true consumption cit:
lnecit = ln cit + uit (19)
Measuring consumption is a difficult task in any household survey and measurement errors are almost
always present. Taking into account explicitly measurement error, the first order condition is
∆ lnecit+1 = [−zit+1∆ lnecit+1 − lnecit∆zit+1]σ +∆ezit+1α+ vit+1 (20)
with5 vit+1 = ∆ηit+1 − ln εit+1 + (1 + zit+1σ)∆uit+1 + uit∆zit+1σ.
Now, we give precisely the properties of random terms εit+1 according to the hypothesis made on markets
completeness:
Full insurance: under the complete markets hypothesis, the random terms εit+1 are aggregate temporal
shocks: εit = εt.
Full insurance within the village: under the complete markets hypothesis in each village v, the random
terms εit+1 are village-level aggregate temporal shocks: εit = εvt .
We make the following assumption concerning the disturbance terms:
Assumption a: The measurement errors on consumption uit are independent and identically distributed
across households and periods.
Assumption b: Conditional on observable household characteristics zit, the unobservable preference
shocks ηit are martingales independent across households and independent of measurement errors
6.
Thus, we can test full insurance taking into account the heterogeneity of preferences but also identify
risk aversion up to a multiplicative factor. The usual tests of complete markets or full insurance consist
in "directional tests" against precise alternatives. They consist in testing the null hypothesis against
the alternative that the random terms εit+1 depend on a household idiosyncratic shock. For example,
5 (1 + θzit+1)∆uit+1 + θuit∆zit+1 = (1 + θzit)∆uit+1 + θuit+1∆zit+1
6∆ηit+1 is a martingale difference implying that ∆ηit+1 is independent of ∆ηit.
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if a negative income shock reduces household consumption during some period, markets are incomplete
because otherwise shocks should be fully insured. But, as in Dubois (2000), an overidentifying restrictions
test of the model (20) allows to perform a “non directional” test of the null hypothesis of complete markets.
This test is non-directional in the sense that it does not test the model against some known alternative but
simply tests the internal consistency of the estimated model. This test has the advantage that it needs not
a known testable alternative that is data like idiosyncratic shocks. However, a directional test is likely to
be more powerful. We therefore use also directional tests. In the case of the within-village full insurance, if
random terms ln εit+1 contain a household specific idiosyncratic innovation then the within-village complete
markets hypothesis is rejected. Consequently, with a variable ωit+1 correlated with the innovation ξit+1
(= δ [ωit+1 −Etωit+1]), we then only need to test that δ = 0 in the estimation of the following equation:
∆ lnecit+1 = [−zit+1∆ lnecit+1 − lnecit∆zit+1]σ +∆ezit+1α+ δωit+1 + evit+1 (21)
with evit+1 = vit+1 − δωit+1 = ∆ηit+1 + (1 + zit+1σ)∆uit+1 + uit∆zit+1σ − ln f (Xit) + ξit+1 and ξit+1 =
δ [ωit+1 −Etωit+1].
Instrumental variables estimation:
To estimate equation (20) under the null hypothesis, we include some village-time dummy variables,
and use the two stage least squares instrumental variables method because the right hand side variables
[zit+1∆ lnecit+1 +∆zit+1 lnecit] are endogenous. Current and lagged exogenous variables (zit+1, zit), and any
variable uncorrelated with preference shocks or measurement errors at time t and t+1 are used as instru-
mental variables. However, the use of a large number of instrumental variables frequently leads to a weak
instruments problem and to biased estimators (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995). To avoid the weak instru-
ments problem which can sensibly affect the asymptotic size of the overidentifying restrictions tests and bias
the instrumental variables estimators in finite samples (Buse, 1992, Magdalinos, 1994, Bound, Jaeger and
Baker, 1995, Staiger and Stock, 1997), we restrict our set of instrumental variables. Consequently, we com-
pute which instruments should be the best correlated to endogenous variables. Appendix A.4 shows how we
determine the set of instrumental variables that should have the strongest correlation with the endogenous
variables under the null hypothesis. These instruments: ∆zit+1 ln cit−1 and zit∆ezit − zit+1∆2ezit+1 (whose
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set is denoted [1] in Tables of results) and also ∆zit+1 (zit+1 + zit − zit−1) ln cit−1 and z2it+1∆2ezit+1−z2it∆ezit
(that then constitute the set of instrumental variables denoted [2]) should be valid under the null hypothe-
sis. Thus, doing an overidentifying restrictions test, for example with the Sargan statistic, we get a test of
the null hypothesis of full insurance. We report part of the first stage instrumental regressions in Appendix
A.5.
The estimation of (20) under the null hypothesis of within village complete markets necessitates the inclu-
sion of numerous dummy variables on the right hand side of the equation (village-time dummies for the
within-village full insurance test) but their estimates will not be presented in Tables of results7.
At last, we remark that when there are measurement errors on consumption, the residuals of equation (20)
are autocorrelated because cov(vit+1, vit) = − (1 + zit+1σ) (1 + zitσ) var(uit). It is necessary to take this
autocorrelation into account in our estimation.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from a survey conducted by IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute) in
Pakistan between 1986 and 1989 (see Alderman and Garcia, 1993). The survey consists of a stratified
random sample interviewed 12 times beginning with 927 households from four districts of three regions
(Attock and Faisalabad in Punjab, Badin in the Sind, and Dir in the North West Frontier Province). For
each of the four districts, the villages were chosen randomly from an exhaustive list of villages classified in
three sets according to their distances to two markets (mandis). In each village, households were randomly
drawn from an exhaustive list. The attrition observed in the data (927 households at the beginning and only
887 at the end) seems to come from administrative and political problems rather than from a self selection of
households (Alderman and Garcia, 1993). We consider this attrition phenomenon as exogenous. Although
the sample is entirely rural, it is not completely agricultural, which has an influence on the distribution
and fluctuations of incomes. However, of the 927 households chosen in the first period, only 22 never
7Moreover, by the Frisch-Waugh theorem, the regression (20) with dummy variables for each village and period is exactly
equivalent to the regression done by replacing all variables by their image through the projection operator on the orthogo-
nal space generated by the corresponding dummy variables (the dependent, explanatory and instrumental variables). The
coefficients of all these dummy variables are very numerous (46 villages×12 periods resulting after first differences in 505
coefficients). We can then transform the model and estimate it by subtracting the period-village average which is equivalent
to the use of the whole set of dummy variables.
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had any agricultural income during the survey. The available data are very rich and contain information
on household demographic characteristics, on incomes disaggregated in numerous sources, on individual
labor supplies, on endowments and owned assets, on agrarian structure, on crops and productions. Some
descriptive statistics appear in Table 1.
Income sources are wages, agricultural profits, rents from property rights, pensions, informal transfers
(from relatives or others).
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The expenditures and incomes are in 1986 Rupees per week, areas are in acres8. Correlations between
income sources for the total sample show that there is quite little covariation between these sources. Actu-
ally the correlation coefficient between agricultural profits and wage income is only -0.01. The correlation
coefficient between agricultural profits and pensions and transfers received is 0.08 and it is 0.70 between
agricultural profits and total income. This should allow income diversification, but all households do not
hold this market portfolio. In particular, the average share of each income source in the total income
shows for example that landless households have a much more important part of their income from wages.
Landless households have on average 80% of their income from wages whereas it is only one third for
landowners. In general, for these rural households, income variability is high because of the Monsoon, of
weather variability generating periods of drought, and of relatively frequent flooding. Besides, the (pseudo)
coefficients of variation of household income9 are large, ranging from 0.31 to 2.76, with a household av-
erage of 0.86 (0.84 on average in Punjab and Sind and 0.90 in the North West Frontier Province). On
the contrary, the coefficients of variation of household consumption are much lower, ranging from 0.009
to 1.98 with an average of 0.40. Only 46 households of 927 have a coefficient of variation of consumption
higher than that of income (97 in the case of total non durable expenditures). Assuming that instantaneous
utility is separable between durable and non durable goods, we can estimate the model using non durable
8Units: 1 Pakistan Rupee (1986) = US$0.0062, 1 acre = 4046.86 m2.
9The per period incomes are net of production input expenditures and then can sometimes be negative. The pseudo
coefficient of variation of yit for a household i is computed as
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expenditures as our consumption variable. In the literature on full insurance tests, food consumption is
often used (Townsend, 1994, Mace, 1991, Cochrane, 1991). Hence, we perform our tests with both food
and non durable expenditures.
At last, we have to take into account the seasonality of behavior. Paxson (1993) has shown the im-
portance of seasonality in the case of Thailand data. The problem would be less stringent with annual
data, but here the average gap between interviews is about four months. Seasonality is a priori an im-
portant phenomenon for these rural households for calendar reasons linked to agricultural activity and
religion (Islam). The agricultural activity in Pakistan is markedly affected by the Monsoon, generating
two plantation and harvest seasons (Kharif for the most humid and Rabi for the driest), which dates vary
with region according to latitude. For the Punjab province, the planting period of the Rabi season is
in November-December, and harvests are in March-April. The plantation period of the Kharif season is
in May and July and harvests are in October and December. We have then to take into account these
seasonal effects in the various specifications because they affect incomes but also mark the rural life with
several celebrations (as the lights feast called dipavali at the end of October and many other ones) or with
the seasonal fluctuations of frequent pathologies (viral diseases, malaria and leishmaniasis). In addition to
this seasonal structure and by several celebrations from Hindus origin, seasons are affected by the religious
Islamic calendar. Several reasons justify then the presence of seasonality in behavior and preferences of
rural households from Pakistan. The total population of the 46 villages varies between 200 and 8000 in-
habitants by village with an average of 1818 and a median of 1108. The average density of the population
of these villages is high with 276 inhabitants per km2 which is higher than the Pakistan average of 163
inhabitants by km2 (World Bank, 1997). 61% of households of this sample own a plot of land. The average
area owned is 9.42 acres or approximately 3.8 hectares but less than a half of these lands are irrigated.
3.3 Empirical Tests: Full Insurance and its Limits
We use the method presented before to test the full insurance property without being forced to do strong
homogeneity assumptions on preferences. The empirical tests consist in estimating equations (20) and
(21) with the instrumental variables method described before. The instrumental regressions are given in
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appendix A.5 with or without the inclusion of the income shock. The correlation between endogenous
variables and the instrumental variables show that we can exclude weak instruments problems. Therefore,
the test of overidentifying restrictions given by the Sargan statistic allows us to test the null hypothesis of
full insurance since these instruments are theoretically valid under the null hypothesis. This non directional
test of the null hypothesis is implemented first with the assumption of separability between consumption
and leisure in the utility function and then with the non separable specification (22) allowing to take into
account labor supply. When labor supply is used in the regressions, the twice lagged variables for male
and female household labor supply are introduced among the instruments: lmit−1, l
f
it−1. So as to take into
account measurement errors in income, we use the rental incomes as instruments for agricultural benefits.
These instruments appear to be very informative because sufficiently correlated with agricultural profits
(see instrumental regression in Table 6 of Appendix A.4), which enables to identify the parameter δ of
agricultural profit with more precision (compared to OLS estimations). When income is not instrumented,
the estimated parameter bδ is much closer to zero and its standard error is two to four times larger.
For the exogenous characteristic variables of households zit+1 and ezit+1, the estimates presented show the
case where these variables are household size, number of children in household and irrigated owned land
per household adult equivalent10. This specification results from a preliminary research that showed that
other demographic characteristics or the composition of owned land do not bring additional information
in the regressions.
Within-village Full Insurance
In Dubois (2000), we have shown that the complete markets hypothesis in the whole country is strongly
rejected whatever the number of instruments used using the tests of overidentifying restrictions by the Sar-
gan statistic. We thus test the within village complete markets hypothesis. It may happen that households
manage to insure themselves against risks with borrowing, lending, solidarity networks, credit and other
mechanisms within the village.
Even if very cautious in the choice of instrumental variables and if we have checked that they were suf-
ficiently informative, we always tried to raise the arbitrary level of significance required in instrumental
10We use the definition of Townsend (1994) for the equivalence scales but the results change only very slightly when we use
other equivalence scales or simply the household size.
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regressions fo keep an instrument. The choice of instruments needs a particular attention to Fisher statis-
tics in instrumental regressions (the instrumental regressions of column (5) of Table 2 are reported in A.4).
The columns (1) and (5) of Table 2 show the estimation of the model under the null hypothesis as well
as the overidentifying restrictions tests (Sargan statistic) that reject the within village complete markets
hypothesis. However, the estimated parameters are much less precise in that case when instruments [1]
only are used. In the consumption leisure non separable case (columns (2) and (6) of Table 2), the overi-
dentifying restrictions test is not always rejected. This non directional test does not allow to reject the
within village complete markets hypothesis. But, the directional tests reject it because agricultural income
shocks have a significant effect on household consumption changes.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Preferences
The estimated parameters σ show that household risk aversion increases with the number of children and
decreases with owned irrigated land per adult equivalent. The number of children within the household
increases risk aversion which can be interpreted by the fact that children are more sensitive to consumption
variations. Households owning more land (per adult equivalent) are less risk averse which corresponds to
the usual wealth interpretation that household risk aversion decreases as a function of owned assets11.
In addition, the estimated parameters for seasonal dummies show that households are more risk averse
during the Kharif harvest period i.e. after the Monsoon. This period is the fourth trimester of the year
and is the period of the more important and risky harvest of the year. This season also corresponds to the
period where numerous traditional feasts occur. It seems that this period is a crucial one during the year
and has then an influence on household preferences turning them more risk averse12.
The estimation of parameters α shows that the marginal utility of consumption increases with household
size and with its wealth in terms of owned irrigated land per adult equivalent.
At last in the case of non separability between consumption and leisure, the labor supply parameters are
11This argument is often used to proxy risk aversion with wealth like in Ackerberg and Botticini (2002).
12For other periods, it seems that during the Monsoon and winter, households are a bit more risk averse than during the
Rabi harvest, but the estimated coefficients are not significantly different.
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quite imprecisely estimated. The results on other coefficients of interests are very slightly modified. It seems
for instance that separability between consumption and leisure can be accepted for these rural households
of Pakistan conditionally to the chosen specification taking into account heterogeneity in preferences.
The limits to risk sharing:
As full risk sharing may be obtained in some villages and not others, we test full risk sharing as in Table
2 but allowing the coefficient δv of the effect of the idiosyncratic shock to be specific to each village. We
do so by interacting agricultural income shocks with village dummy variables. We also use interactions
between rental incomes and village dummy variables as instruments. Thus equation (21) becomes
∆ lnecit+1 = [−zit+1∆ lnecit+1 − lnecit∆zit+1]σ +∆ezit+1α+ δvωit+1 + evit+1
Overall, the estimation results look similar to those of Table 2 except that 46 coefficients δv are now esti-
mated. We will also consider the case where δv depends also on the season and is denoted δvt. We do not
report the full results but rather examine the correlations between these coefficients or the probability of
rejection of full insurance (that is whether δv is significantly different from 0) and some village character-
istics. Also, for comparison purpose, we estimate this equation in the case where no heterogeneity of risk
aversion would have been allowed, that is
∆ lnecit+1 = ∆ezit+1α+ δvωit+1 + evit+1
A first interesting result is the fact that there is a lot of heterogeneity between villages in the value of
the coefficient δv and in the rejection probability. Full insurance is not rejected in all villages at the same
significance level. At the 5% level, it is rejected only in 30% of villages (10% only when we do not account
for heterogeneity of risk aversions), and more rejections occur in the provinces of Sind and the NWFP than
in Punjab.
We now examine the determinants of the limits to risk sharing and test some theoretical predictions
about the variables that matter for the value of risk sharing within a community like the variability and
correlations of income within the community or the degree of risk aversion. We construct measures of
the within village correlations across households for variables like income, agricultural income or other
characteristics by looking at the correlation between these values for any pair of households belonging to
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the same village. These measures of correlations are denoted ρ{i,j}∈v. The following table presents some
descriptive statistics of these values:
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 4 then shows the regression results of the estimated coefficients δv on village characteristics. We
also report the probit regressions of the rejection dummy variables (at the 5% level) on these characteristics.
We do this both in the case where the δv were estimated taking into account the heterogeneity of risk
aversion and without heterogeneity. In the village characteristics, we use the preference estimates to
compute measures of average risk aversion and heterogeneity of risk aversion for each village. For each
village and period, we compute the average risk aversion denoted σv = 1#{i∈v}
P
i∈v σ(zit) and the variance
of risk aversion within the village denoted varvσ. The results show that full risk sharing is more likely to be
rejected in villages where agricultural incomes are more correlated in which case we know that the value of
perfect risk sharing is, everything else equal, lower. Also, the higher is average risk aversion and the more
heterogeneous it is, the more likely full risk sharing is rejected. This empirical result is inconsistent with
the prediction of section 2.1 that the value of perfect risk sharing within a group of exogenous size increases
with the average level of risk aversion. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis where only perfect risk sharing
within the village could be obtain and cannot reject that risk sharing groups form endogenously. The
imperfect risk sharing observed may be due to perfect risk sharing within a smaller group of endogenous
size that is not observed. However, with limited commitment, these empirical results may lead to different
inference.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
If the population size of the village is identical to the risk sharing group to which households participate,
it is interesting to study its correlation with rejections of full insurance to distinguish whether coalition
formations or individual deviations due to limited commitment are the source of imperfect risk sharing. As
villages where full insurance is rejected are on average larger, it seems to indicate that not only individual
deviations limit risk sharing but also groups of households because of deviations in coalitions.
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4 Conclusion
This study of the determinants of the value of informal risk sharing groups allowed to show theoretically the
expected effects of heterogeneity of preferences and of limited commitment constraints in risk sharing. We
tested several implications on data from rural Pakistan taking into account the heterogeneity of households’
preferences. The empirical evidence is consistent with most predictions and show that risk sharing in these
village economies seems not to be restricted by coalition formation but rather that risk sharing occurs
in sufficiently small groups that form endogenously. Our results show that exogenous size of risk sharing
groups can be rejected or that imperfect risk sharing only is obtained within the village because of limited
commitment and the risk of coalition formation that needs to be deterred. More empirical research needs
to be done, in particular with data allowing to better identify informal risk sharing groups and risk aversion
behavior of households.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 7 Whatever n, the probability distribution of yn+1 second order stochastically dominates the prob-
ability distribution of yn.
Proof. From Theorem 2 of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), we know that the random variable X2
dominates in the second order stochastic sense the random variable X1 if and only if there exists a random
variable ε such that X1 has the same distribution as X2 + ε and E (ε|X2) = 0. As
yn =
1
n
nX
i=1
yi =
µ
1 +
1
n
¶Ã
1
n+ 1
n+1X
i=1
yi
!
− 1
n
yn+1
= yn+1 +
1
n (n+ 1)
n+1X
i=1
[yi − yn+1]
and
E
Ãn+1X
i=1
[yi − yn+1] |yn+1
!
=
n+1X
i=1
[E (yi|yn+1)−E (yn+1|yn+1)] = 0
because (yi)i=1,...,n+1 are assumed identically distributed, E (yi|yn+1) = E (yj|yn+1) ∀j, ∀i = 1, .., n +
1. Thus it proves that the probability distribution of yn+1 second order stochastically dominates the
probability distribution of yn.
The lemma 7, simply implies that ∀u (.), increasing concave Eu (yn+1) ≥ Eu (yn). Then, vcN and the
difference vcN − va are an increasing functions of the size of the group N since va does not depend on N .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma 8 With assumptions 1 and 2, δ (k,N) is increasing in k, N , ρ, decreasing in β, ω2, σ, and:
lim
k,N→∞
δ (k,N) = +∞
lim
β→1
δ (k,N) = 0
lim
ω2→∞
δ (k,N) = 0
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Actually
δ (k,N) = k
1
(1− ρ)ω2
1− β
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So with the result of lemma 4 and noting
δ (k,N) = max
z1,z2∈[y,y]
½
k −N
N
[z1 − z2]
∙
σ
2
∙
k +N
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z1 +
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the condition for k-coalition proofness is indeed δ (k,N) ≤ 1. We then introduce the notation z∗ =
1/σ − N+kN
¡
y − y
¢
to discriminate between three possible cases which lead to a different expression of the
maximum function in the definition of δ (.).
• “Low” Absolute Risk Aversion: σ (y) ≤ 1/2 £y − y¤ , then z∗ ≥ y and
δ (k,N) =
1
(1− ρ)ω2
1− β
β
k
£
y − y
¤ ∙
2
µ
1
σ
− y
¶
− N + k
N
¡
y − y
¢¸
• “High” Absolute Risk Aversion: σ ¡y¢ ≥ 1/ £y − y¤, then z∗ ≤ y and
δ (k,N) =
1
(1− ρ)ω2
1− β
β
Nk
N + k
∙
1
σ
− y
¸2
• “Medium” Absolute Risk Aversion: σ ¡y¢ ≤ 1/ £y − y¤ and σ (y) ≥ 1/2 £y − y¤ , then z∗ ∈ £y, y¤ and
δ (k,N) =
1
(1− ρ)ω2
1− β
β
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µ
k
(N + k)
N
£
y − y
¤2
, k
£
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Actually, with f (z1, z2) = k−NN [z1 − z2]
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The result of the proposition follows directly from the preceding lemma and the implicit functions
theorem. N∗ = argmaxN {N : ∀k < N, δ (k,N) ≤ 1} = argmaxN {N : δ (N − 1, N) ≤ 1}. Let eN∗ be such
that δ
³ eN∗ − 1, eN∗´ = 1, N∗ = I h eN∗i where I [.] is the integer part operator. Thanks to the implicit
function theorem eN∗ is increasing in β, ω2, σ, and decreasing in ρ like N∗.
With limN→∞ δ (1,N) = δ (1,∞) > 0.
δ (1,∞) is decreasing in β, ω2 and limβ→1 δ (1,∞) = 0.
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> 0. Then obviously, δ (1,∞) is
decreasing in β and limβ→1 δ (1,∞) = 0. So ∃β∗ < 1 such that δ (1,∞) ≤ 1 for β ≥ β∗.
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A.3 Labor Supply
Until now, we have considered that consumption and leisure were separable in households utility functions.
As this specification assumption may not be true, non-separability of consumption and leisure can lead to
biased estimates if we neglect the household leisure demand or equivalently its labor supply (Browning and
Meghir, 1991). Income and hours of labor supply are obviously highly correlated. It seems then important
to take into account household labor supply otherwise its omission has similar effects to some unobserved
preference shocks correlated with income biasing the income variable coefficient in our regressions. Taking
into account the non separability between consumption and leisure we can avoid this problem provided
that our specification is correct. For consumption c and labor supply l, we will assume that the utility of
household i at time t is of the following form
βtuit(c, l) = exp(ezitα) c1−zitσ
1− zitσ
(1 + l)−γ (22)
where γ is a preference parameter of the household.
The first order condition with respect to consumption remains similar13 and taking logarithms we get:
∆ ln cit+1 = −zit+1σ ln cit+1 + zitσ ln cit − γ∆ ln lit+1 +∆ezit+1α+∆ηit+1 − ln εit+1
A.4 Instrumental Variables
Let’s derive the form of instruments under the Null Hypothesis of Full Insurance. We have the following
equation
∆ ln cit+1 = [−zit+1 ln cit+1 + zit ln cit]σ +∆ezit+1α+ vit+1 (23)
or equivalently
∆ ln cit+1 = [−zit+1∆ ln cit+1 − ln cit∆zit+1]σ +∆ezit+1α+ vit+1 (24)
Besides the variables [−zit+1 ln cit+1 + zit ln cit] of this equation are endogenous while variables ∆ezit+1 are
considered as exogenous.
In the case of separability between consumption and leisure, we can write the expectations:
(1 + zit+1σ) ln cit+1 = (1 + zitσ) ln cit +∆ezit+1α
13The first order condition with respect to labor supply is not useful for our tests.
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Hence
ln cit+1 =
1+ zitσ
1 + zit+1σ
ln cit +
∆ezit+1α
1 + zit+1σ
and at time t
ln cit =
1+ zit−1σ
1 + zitσ
ln cit−1 +
∆ezitα
1 + zitσ
(25)
Then
ln cit+1 =
1 + zitσ
1 + zit+1σ
∙
1 + zit−1σ
1 + zitσ
ln cit−1 +
∆ezitα
1 + zitσ
¸
+
∆ezit+1α
1 + zit+1σ
ln cit+1 =
1+ zit−1σ
1 + zit+1σ
ln cit−1 +
∆2ezit+1α
1 + zit+1σ
(26)
where ∆2 is the second difference operator defined by ∆2Xt+1 = Xt+1 −Xt−1.
But according to (24), [−zit+1 ln cit+1 + zit ln cit]σ = ∆ ln cit+1 −∆ezit+1α, using (25) and (26), we get:
[−zit+1 ln cit+1 + zit ln cit]σ=
− (1 + zit−1σ)∆zit+1σ
(1 + zit+1σ) (1 + zitσ)
ln cit−1+
∆2ezit+1α
1 + zit+1σ
-
∆ezitα
1 + zitσ
-∆ezit+1α
Writing simply a second order series expansion in σ of these expressions:
We have 1(1+zit+1σ)(1+zitσ) = 1− (zit+1 + zit)σ +
¡
z2it + zit+1zit + z
2
it+1
¢
σ2 + o
¡
σ2
¢
Hence (1+zit−1σ)(1+zit+1σ)(1+zitσ) = 1− (zit+1 + zit − zit−1)σ + o (σ)
Leading to −(1+zit−1σ)∆zit+1σ(1+zit+1σ)(1+zitσ) = −∆zit+1σ+∆zit+1 (zit+1 + zit − zit−1)σ
2+o
¡
σ2
¢
since ∆
2ezit+1α
1+zit+1σ -
∆ezitα
1+zitσ = ∆ezit+1α+[zit∆ezit-zit+1∆2ezit+1]ασ+[z2it+1∆2ezit+1-z2it∆ezit]ασ2+o ¡σ2¢
After some rearrangements and simplifications, we obtain
[−zit+1 ln cit+1 + zit ln cit]σ ∼σ=0 -∆zit+1σ ln cit−1+[zit∆ezit − zit+1∆2ezit+1]ασ (27)
+∆zit+1 (zit+1 + zit − zit−1)σ2 ln cit−1+[z2it+1∆2ezit+1 − z2it∆ezit]ασ2
The following instrumental variables are theoretically valid:
−∆zit+1 ln cit−1, zit∆ezit − zit+1∆2ezit+1
at the first order, to which we can add at the second order
∆zit+1 (zit+1 + zit − zit−1) ln cit−1, z2it+1∆2ezit+1 − z2it∆ezit
34
A.5 Instrumental regressions
In estimation methods with instrumental variables, it is important to present first stage instrumental
regressions when an instrumentation method is used (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995, Magdalinos, 1994,
Staiger and Stock, 1997). As we cannot present all of them, we show only those concerning the basic within
village complete markets hypothesis in the case of consumption leisure separability (Table 5 corresponds to
the first step regressions of column (5) of Table 2). Each column of Table 5 is the instrumental regression of
one endogenous variable. The instrumental regressions in the case where agricultural income is introduced
and where it is instrumented by rental incomes are in Table 6. They correspond to the first step estimation
of column (7) in Table 2. Again, all dummy variables are also not shown in these Tables.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
[TABLE 6 HERE]
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TABLES
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics on the full sample (all periods)
Variable Average Std Err. Obs.
Food consumption 197.9 151.4 9990
Other non durable expenditures (heating, ..) 47.3 196.1 9991
Total owned land area (acres) 9.42 21.81 10083
Irrigated land (acres) 4.19 11.25 10083
Non irrigated land (acres) 5.24 17.09 10083
Rented in land under fixed rent (acres) 0.58 3.93 10083
Rented in land under sharecropping (acres) 2.75 6.03 10083
Rented out land under fixed rent (acres) 0.38 3.71 10083
Rented out land under sharecropping (acres) 3.72 14.56 10083
Household size 8.64 4.23 9987
Number of children (<=15years) 4.08 2.91 9987
Wage income 141.9 298.3 9906
Pensions 70.5 450.5 9906
Agricultural profits 109.26 1095.6 9906
Transfers 106 974 9906
Total income (without transfers) 321.7 1291.1 9906
Male labor (person*day/week) 2.62 4.13 9889
Female labor (person*day/week) 0.53 1.89 9885
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Table 2: Results of within village full insurance tests
Dependant variable: ∆lnecit+1
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
σ: zit+1
Number of children 0.054 0.060 0.042 0.057 0.060 0.072 0.052 0.065
(1.44) (1.50) (1.17) (1.48) (2.05) (2.20) (1.86) (2.11)
Household size -0.018 -0.022 -0.019 -0.031 -0.038 -0.042 -0.038 -0.044
(0.76) (0.83) (0.86) (1.26) (2.19) (2.25) (2.30) (2.43)
Irrigated owned land/ad. eq. -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.027 -0.024 -0.031 -0.027
(0.56) (0.58) (0.70) (0.63) (1.88) (1.53) (2.21) (1.86)
Seasonal dummies
1: Winter -0.104 -0.109 -0.115 -0.133 -0.133 -0.141 -0.141 -0.151
(1.56) (1.57) (1.86) (2.03) (2.54) (2.47) (2.83) (2.80)
2: Rabi harvest -0.029 -0.028 -0.061 -0.058 -0.076 -0.067 -0.098 -0.091
(0.33) (0.31) (0.75) (0.70) (1.08) (0.89) (1.51) (1.31)
3: Monsoon -0.159 -0.149 -0.165 -0.125 -0.169 -0.142 -0.175 -0.152
(2.20) (1.58) (2.44) (1.39) (2.94) (2.22) (3.20) (2.51)
4: (reference): Kharif harvest
α: ezit+1
Number of children 0.295 0.326 0.222 0.308 0.321 0.387 0.278 0.351
(1.42) (1.48) (1.13) (1.45) (2.00) (2.15) (1.80) (2.05)
Household size -0.052 -0.079 -0.060 -0.133 -0.172 -0.196 -0.174 -0.204
(0.39) (0.52) (0.49) (0.94) (1.76) (1.82) (1.86) (2.00)
Irrigated owned land/ad. eq. -0.054 -0.055 -0.064 -0.059 -0.127 -0.110 -0.143 -0.128
(0.58) (0.59) (0.74) (0.67) (1.92) (1.54) (2.27) (1.89)
γ
lfit+1 : Female labor -0.072 -0.306 -0.231 -0.209
(0.15) (0.70) (1.52) (1.44)
lmit+1 : Male labor 0.047 0.141 0.073 0.085
(0.30) (0.91) (0.68) (0.82)
δ: ωit+1
Agricultural income 6.47 10-5 6.61 10-5 4.44 10-5 4.50 10-5
(2.54) (2.42) (2.27) (2.11)
Instruments [1] [1] [1] [1] [2] [2] [2] [2]
Inst. labor supply lmit-1 ,l
f
it-1 * * * *
Degrees of freedom: # 3 3 3 3 12 12 12 12
Sargan statistic: χ2(#) 0.225 0.157 1.505 0.864 12.89 8.57 14.90 10.81
Observations 7740 7731 7740 7731 7740 7731 7740 7731
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Statistics across villages Mean Min. Max
ρ{i,j}∈v owned land -0.074 -0.24 -0.016
ρ{i,j}∈v agr. income 0.139 -0.040 0.677
ρ{i,j}∈v total income 0.066 -0.064 0.55
ρ{i,j}∈v household size -0.067 -0.239 0.11
ρ{i,j}∈v exogenous income shock -0.022 -0.174 0.119
ρ{i,j}∈v number children -0.066 -0.243 0.142
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Table 4: Results on determinants of full insurance rejection
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
(robust standard errors) Preferences Preferences
OLS Probit OLS Probit
Dependent Variable δv Reject (1) vs δv Reject (1) vs
Accept (0) Accept (0)
Explanatory Variable
ρ{i,j}∈v owned land -0.004 -18.347 -0.010 14.827
(0.005) (2.868) (0.003) (3.822)
ρ{i,j}∈v agr. income -0.030 26.067 -0.008 4.187
(0.009) (1.794) (0.004) (0.916)
ρ{i,j}∈v total income 0.035 -41.145 0.008 -6.755
(0.012) (3.474) (0.006) (1.248)
ρ{i,j}∈v household size -0.000 32.738 -0.010 -17.715
(0.006) (4.823) (0.004) (4.876)
ρ{i,j}∈v exogenous income -0.018 0.603 -0.006 -9.066
(0.009) (1.680) (0.004) (1.860)
ρ{i,j}∈v number children -0.029 -9.562 -0.004 -3.049
(0.008) (3.778) (0.005) (2.652)
population of village - - 1.6.10−7 9.10−5
- - (7.10−8) (4.10−5)
ρ{i,j}∈v agr. income× - - 1.6.10−7 8.10−4
population - - (4.10−7) (4.10−4)
σv 0.039 36.263 0.016 6.832
(0.008) (2.850) (0.006) (1.650)
varvσ -0.043 105.753 -0.008 30.135
(0.016) (7.906) (0.011) (5.039)
Constant -0.034 -49.699 -0.018 -10.872
(0.007) (3.535) (0.006) (1.651)
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Table 5: Instrumental regressions
Instrumented variables [-zit+1lncit+1+zit lncit ]
zit+1 Nb.. of children Household size Irrigated land Winter Rabi Monsoon
Explanatory variables
zit+1 ∆zit+1
Nb. of children -2.48981 -1.56148 -0.38542 -0.27182 0.04701 -0.20300
(1.80) (0.60) (0.82) (1.59) (0.34) (1.43)
Household size 0.09803 -1.54706 0.02659 0.19602 -0.00702 0.00521
(0.10) (0.86) (0.08) (1.66) (0.07) (0.05)
Irrigated land -1.58406 -2.42193 -3.39219 -0.22457 -0.00253 -0.09967
(1.31) (1.07) (8.30) (1.51) (0.02) (0.80)
zit+1 (∆zit+1)lncit-1
Nb. of children -0.49791 0.25229 0.05247 0.04671 -0.00682 0.03658
(1.93) (0.52) (0.60) (1.47) (0.26) (1.38)
Household size -0.00569 -0.61029 0.01390 -0.03581 0.00267 -0.00386
(0.03) (1.84) (0.23) (1.64) (0.15) (0.21)
Irrigated land 0.36749 0.61096 -0.08021 0.04902 -0.00167 0.03818
(1.42) (1.26) (0.92) (1.54) (0.06) (1.44)
Winter -0.36648 -0.61409 -0.22240 -0.43938 0.03465 0.01052
(1.50) (1.35) (2.69) (14.58) (1.40) (0.42)
Rabi 0.26855 0.57257 -0.20795 -0.10504 -0.25796 0.02112
(0.89) (1.01) (2.02) (2.81) (8.38) (0.68)
Monsoon -1.43126 -2.16562 0.00890 -0.01070 -0.00072 -0.43896
(3.32) (2.69) (0.06) (0.20) (0.02) (9.91)
zit+1 (∆zit+1)(zit+1+zit-zit-1)lncit-1
Nb. of children 0.00450 -0.02708 0.00454 -0.00528 0.00116 -0.00468
(0.14) (0.44) (0.41) (1.30) (0.35) (1.39)
Household size -0.00186 0.00538 -0.00505 0.00316 0.00054 -0.00018
(0.12) (0.19) (0.96) (1.66) (0.35) (0.11)
Irrigated land -0.08031 -0.14621 -0.10005 -0.00655 0.00037 -0.00993
(1.79) (1.75) (6.59) (1.18) (0.08) (2.16)
Winter 0.27402 0.81847 0.13812 0.07848 -0.03179 0.00822
(1.23) (1.96) (1.82) (2.84) (1.40) (0.36)
Rabi -0.18609 -0.35104 0.23528 0.10310 -0.06799 -0.01950
(0.59) (0.59) (2.18) (2.63) (2.11) (0.60)
Monsoon 1.11738 1.67330 -0.10169 0.02676 0.03370 0.02300
(2.43) (1.94) (0.65) (0.47) (0.72) (0.49)
zit+1 zit∆zit − zit+1∆2zit+1
Nb. of children 0.12186 -0.12102 0.00773 -0.02655 0.00386 -0.02969
(0.68) (0.36) (0.13) (1.21) (0.21) (1.62)
Household size 0.03123 0.16584 -0.01440 0.01582 0.00732 0.00064
(0.37) (1.06) (0.51) (1.54) (0.86) (0.07)
Irrigated land -0.33064 -0.54969 -0.25307 -0.02540 -0.00062 -0.02993
(1.57) (1.40) (3.55) (0.98) (0.03) (1.38)
zit+1 z2it+1∆
2zit+1 − z2it∆zit
Nb. of children 0.00442 0.00621 -0.00138 0.00055 -0.00019 -0.00046
(1.13) (0.85) (1.04) (1.14) (0.48) (1.16)
Household size 0.00123 0.00278 0.00054 -0.00016 0.00009 0.00020
(1.04) (1.26) (1.35) (1.11) (0.78) (1.68)
Irrigated land 0.00194 0.00537 0.00903 0.00020 0.00001 0.00056
(1.05) (1.56) (14.46) (0.90) (0.03) (2.96)
Observations 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740
R2 0.58 0.52 0.80 0.14 0.11 0.17
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Table 6: Instrumental regressions
Instrumented variables [-zit+1lncit+1+zit lncit] ∆ωit+1
zit+1 Nb. of children Household size Irrigated land Winter Rabi Monsoon Agr. income
Explanatory variables
zit+1 ∆zit+1
Nb. of children -2.489 -1.56 -0.385 -0.271 0.047 -0.203 1392.0
(1.80) (0.60) (0.82) (1.59) (0.34) (1.43) (1.89)
Household size 0.098 -1.547 0.026 0.196 -0.007 0.005 -79.24
(0.10) (0.86) (0.08) (1.66) (0.07) (0.05) (0.16)
Irrigated land -1.58 -2.421 -3.39 -0.224 -0.002 -0.099 -1214.9
(1.31) (1.07) (8.30) (1.51) (0.02) (0.80) (1.89)
zit+1 (∆zit+1)lncit-1
Nb. of children -0.497 0.252 0.052 0.046 -0.0068 0.036 -310.9
(1.93) (0.52) (0.60) (1.47) (0.26) (1.38) (2.27)
Household size -0.005 -0.610 0.0139 -0.0358 0.002 -0.003 49.87
(0.03) (1.84) (0.23) (1.64) (0.15) (0.21) (0.53)
Irrigated land 0.367 0.610 -0.08 0.049 -0.0016 0.038 295.42
(1.42) (1.26) (0.92) (1.54) (0.06) (1.44) (2.15)
Winter -0.366 -0.61409 -0.22240 -0.439 0.034 0.0105 -60.22
(1.50) (1.35) (2.69) (14.58) (1.40) (0.42) (0.46)
Rabi 0.268 0.57257 -0.20795 -0.105 -0.257 0.0211 -44.221
(0.89) (1.01) (2.02) (2.81) (8.38) (0.68) (0.27)
Monsoon -1.431 -2.16 0.008 -0.0107 -0.000 -0.438 113.97
(3.32) (2.69) (0.06) (0.20) (0.02) (9.91) (0.50)
zit+1 (∆zit+1)(zit+1 + zit − zit-1)lncit-1
Nb. of children 0.0045 -0.027 0.0045 -0.0052 0.0011 -0.0046 5.416
(0.14) (0.44) (0.41) (1.30) (0.35) (1.39) (0.31)
Household size -0.0018 0.0053 -0.005 0.0031 0.00054 -0.00018 5.514
(0.12) (0.19) (0.96) (1.66) (0.35) (0.11) (0.67)
Irrigated land -0.0803 -0.1462 -0.10 -0.0065 0.0003 -0.009 -50.50
(1.79) (1.75) (6.59) (1.18) (0.08) (2.16) (2.12)
Winter 0.274 0.818 0.138 0.078 -0.0317 0.008 -27.57
(1.23) (1.96) (1.82) (2.84) (1.40) (0.36) (0.23)
Rabi -0.186 -0.351 0.235 0.103 -0.067 -0.019 -84.85
(0.59) (0.59) (2.18) (2.63) (2.11) (0.60) (0.50)
Monsoon 1.11738 1.67330 -0.10169 0.02676 0.03370 0.02300 -204.1
(2.43) (1.94) (0.65) (0.47) (0.72) (0.49) (0.83)
zit+1 zit∆zit − zit+1∆2zit+1
Nb. of children 0.12186 -0.12102 0.00773 -0.02655 0.00386 -0.02969 -54.27
(0.68) (0.36) (0.13) (1.21) (0.21) (1.62) (0.57)
Household size 0.03123 0.16584 -0.01440 0.01582 0.00732 0.00064 59.62
(0.37) (1.06) (0.51) (1.54) (0.86) (0.07) (1.34)
Irrigated land -0.33064 -0.54969 -0.25307 -0.02540 -0.00062 -0.02993 -186.8
(1.57) (1.40) (3.55) (0.98) (0.03) (1.38) (1.67)
zit+1 z2it+1∆
2zit+1 − z2it∆zit
Nb. of children 0.0044 0.00621 -0.00138 0.00055 -0.00019 -0.00046 -3.32
(1.13) (0.85) (1.04) (1.14) (0.48) (1.16) (1.60)
Household size 0.0012 0.0027 0.00054 -0.00016 0.00009 0.00020 0.788
(1.04) (1.26) (1.35) (1.11) (0.78) (1.68) (1.26)
Irrigated land 0.0019 0.0053 0.00903 0.00020 0.00001 0.00056 2.190
(1.05) (1.56) (14.46) (0.90) (0.03) (2.96) (2.23)
Income from rents 0.475
(12.16)
Observations 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740 7740
R2 0.58 0.52 0.80 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.02
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